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Martin Müller’s “Global East”: 
The Next Episode in Central Europe’s 
Failed Quest to Be Something 
Other than it Is
Central Europeans have very rich language for describing 
their own countries in unflattering manner and very, very 
long tradition of doing so. In this article author proposes 
a hypothesis for unusually low collective self-esteem. It is 
deeply rooted in the region’s peripheral relation with the 
West. It is a by-product of a yawning gap between rich, 
powerful, industrialized West and stagnant Central Europe. 
Müller’s “Global East” is, from this perspective, one of the 
(many) attempts to overcome region’s peripheral status.







“Grey place”. This was the first and foremost impression of Martin 
Müller’s students about ex–Soviet countries. They perceived Central 
Europe as “terra incognita of the world, where Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro and Molvania blend into an amorphous mass”. This shows 
the difficulty of the task that Müller attempted — to establish the “Glo-
bal East” as a geographical and political concept, to rival the “Global 
South”. Brazil is fun, Kenya is exotic, India is spectacular: Central and 
Eastern Europe is just dull and grey. A lot of people — including many 
Central Europeans — think so. The Polish writer Ziemowit Szczerek, 
who wrote a number of books about self-perception of Poles and other 
Eastern and Central Europeans, noted that there are innumerable words 
and expressions in their languages used to disparage their homelands 
(which they declare to love, by the way). For example, Croats use the 
word vukojebina (literally “the place where wolves fuck”), which is a rough 
equivalent of the Polish zadupie (“the place behind or below the arse”) 
(Szczerek 2018). Finis terrae, anus mundi, the place where the “dogs bark 
with their asses” — Central Europeans have very rich language for descri-
bing their own countries in an unflattering manner and very, very long 
tradition of doing so. 
Of course there is also a hierarchy among the damned. We have 
better and worse places, even in our beloved Central Europe. In one of 
the Szczerek’s novels–reportages (the relationship between facts and 
author’s imagination is never completely clear in his works) he quotes 
a young Ukrainian woman:
Why do you come here, you Poles […] You come here because in other coun-
tries they laugh at you. And they think of you the same way as you think about 
us: as a backward shit-hole you can sneer at. And feel superior towards. […] 
Because everyone thinks you’re impoverished, Eastern trash. […] Not just the 
Germans, but also the Czechs, even the Slovaks and the Hungarians. You only 
think the Hungarians are such fucking awesome pals of yours. But in fact they 
make fun of you just like everyone else. Not to mention the Serbs and the 
Croats. Even the Lithuanians, pal. Everyone thinks you’re just a slightly different 
version of Russia. The third world. It’s only here that you can be patronizing. 
Here you make up for the fact that everywhere else they wipe their asses with 
you (Kalin 2018).
A few years ago I wrote a book about the Polish collective self–image 
— based on hundreds of literary works, journalistic articles, and private 
letters (Leszczyński 2016). I concluded that the negative self-image of 
Poles has been surprisingly constant since at least the late 18th century 
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and was fully formed by the middle of the 19th century. It has not 
evolved since. The rightists and the leftists; conservatives and moderni-
zers; men and women; all of them, despite many differences, had very 
similar list of perceived Polish moral faults and social defects. Let’s list 
them: a low level of personal hygiene; bad roads; ugly and chaotic cities; 
low level of education among the citizenry; elites that are poorly edu-
cated, intellectually shallow and uncurious; uncivil and unpleasant social 
life; a public administration which is unfriendly to citizens; and overall 
poverty and hopelessness. The high achievements of science and civili-
zation are not to be found here, in Poland — they all come from the 
West. In the words of one of the most famous Polish writers, Bolesław 
Prus (1847–1912), Poland does not contribute anything to the treasury 
of human civilization. We are freeriders; we just take inventions and 
ideas produced elsewhere (that is — in the West). We, Poles, only try 
to implement them here, in our land, and we do it usually poorly. Prus 
repeated this accusation many times during the 40-plus years of his 
journalistic career.
What lies beneath this unusually low self-esteem? What are the 
reasons for it? Polish nobles in the early modern age — before the Enli-
ghtenment — had a rather good, if not excellent, opinion about them-
selves and their sociopolitical system. My theory is that the real reason 
for this decline in self-perception was the discovery of growing gap 
between the rich, powerful, industrializing West and stagnant Central 
Europe. In the terms of Immanuel Wallerstein, Polish lands were the 
first semi-periphery to the West – the center of the world system. We 
were close and similar to the West, but at the same time also distant, 
poorer, weaker, infinitely less important in the magnificent game of 
geopolitics. The Polish elites were aware of this in the 1750s. The mass 
exodus of poor peasants from Polish territories to the West, which star-
ted in the 1870s, brought ample possibilities to compare the quality of 
life between the “old” country and “new” one. The results were disastrous 
for the collective self–image. 
When one reads the letters and memoirs left to us by Polish immi-
grants — many of them have been published — it is hard not to notice 
the deep feelings of alienation and contempt for the homeland. Let’s 
discuss one — but representative — example here. In 1929, an emigre 
visited Poland after many years spent in the USA. He published his 
impressions from his old village (near Rzeszów) in the periodical “Zie-
mia Rzeszowska”. Let’s quote:
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After arriving in the village, I experienced various contradictory feelings. I was 
offended by the old customs of our people, I was stunned by the barefoot, dirty, 
sunburned legs of girls, elderly women, children and men, legs red like baked 
crayfish. It looks so archaic to me now, so reminiscent of slavery, just so poor 
and unsightly that it really felt offensive. Not everyone walks like this out of 
necessity, for lack of shoes, but simply out of habit. However, the emigrants, 
those who returned to Poland from the world, they do not live like this anymore 
(Duda-Dziewierz 1938, 141-142).
In the author’s eyes there was an opposition between Poland and the 
“world”, where he now lived and where life was better. The peasant 
women, he wrote, looked like “our [American] Indians”. The smells of 
his village were a mixture of “heavenly aromas” of fields and meadows 
with a terrible stench of unwashed human bodies. The visitor noted:
In Western countries, especially in America, bathing has become an almost daily 
necessity in every season of the year, and here they don’t bathe in the villages 
for years, and some people don’t know what bath is! (...) The people use the 
same spaces for barns and pigsties and human dwellings (...) This makes the 
proverbial fresh air in the countryside an extremely stupid joke, paradox or 
irony, because while the fields smell like divine aromas (...), the nasty killing 
stench of stables and henhouses and pigsties in country huts makes you sick 
(...). Imagine what it feels like in summer, when billions of flies hatch, when all 
of them fly to the dung, and then swarms into open doors, windows and apart-
ments, sit on food, draw in pots and milk (Duda-Dziewierz 1938, 141-142).
It would be very easy to fill not just a book, but a library with the 
records of such experiences.
This is the local perspective on “Global East”. From the Western 
perspective, Müller’s “Global East” — meaning Central and Eastern 
Europe — was also a no–place, an empty space between Germany and 
the three Oriental capitals: St. Petersburg, Moscow and Constantinople. 
Let’s quote one such description from a Western traveler. In 1784 the 
British explorer William Coxe published, in London, a well–received 
description of his travels to Poland, Denmark, Sweden and Russia. He 
described Poland as a fallen, once-great nation, but at the same time 
uncivilized and primitive.
The nation has few manufactures, scarcely any commerce; a king almost without 
any authority; the nobles in the state of uncontrolled anarchy; the peasants 
groaning under a yoke of feudal despotism far worse than the tyranny of an 
absolute monarch. I never before observed such an inequality of fortune, such 
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sudden transition from extreme riches to extreme poverty; wherever I turned 
my eyes, luxury and wretchedness were constant neighbours. (...) The peasants 
in Poland, as in all feudal governments, are serfs or slaves; and the value of an 
estate is not estimated so much from its extent, as from the number of its 
peasants, who are transferred from one master to another like so many head of 
cattle (Coxe 1784, 122, 129). 
While local elites wanted to compare their capitals to Paris — for 
example, both Warsaw and Bucharest liked to call themselves the “Paris 
of the East” — foreign visitors saw no Paris, but something more similar 
to a dirty eastern bazaar. The Polish historian Błażej Brzostek wrote an 
excellent book (2015) about both local aspirations and the experiences of 
Western travelers. It is a very worthwhile read — even if rather sad. 
In 1994, the American historian Larry Wolff (1994) subjected the 
Western experience of Central and Eastern Europe to a thorough decon-
struction (Coxe, quoted earlier, was one of his heroes). In their descrip-
tion of our land, it is impossible to distinguish projection from obse-
rvation — so Wolff argued. In the 18th century, the Western European 
Enlightenment projected Eastern Europe — a vast area stretching 
between Berlin and Vienna in the west, and St. Petersburg and Istanbul 
in the east — as its opposite, as the antithesis of Western “civilization” 
(this word held a special place in the vocabulary of the Enlightenment). 
Bad roads; poor and oppressed peasants, living in conditions close to 
those of animals; dirty inns; sophisticated elites living in palaces among 
general poverty; widespread violence and brutality mixed with elements 
of dress and manners brought from the West — these were the common 
elements of these descriptions, regardless of whether they related to 
Wallachia, the lands of the Commonwealth or Hungary. In this picture, 
Eastern Europe played the roles of the distant periphery of the West and 
its oriental mirror. It was the “place between” the proper Orient, that is 
Russia and Turkey, and the actual West, whose border ended in Germany 
and Austria.
This image of Eastern Europe, Wolff added, was a great political tool 
for the predatory empires — Prussia, Austria and Russia — which, in 
the name of “civilization”, colonized this territory. Comparisons of the 
inhabitants of the Commonwealth to peoples from distant non-European 
lands were an open invitation to conquest. “A country as virgin as 
Canada” — Jean-Emmanuel Gilbert (1741–1814), a French naturalist 
whom Coxe met during his stay in Grodno, wrote about Lithuania.
Wolff wrote his book in the early 1990s, when Eastern Europe was 
emerging from decades-long communist rule. His story (like any histo-
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rian’s narrative) was shaped by the time it was written, its hopes and 
fears. Wolff’s message — namely that the image of Eastern Europe as 
a region of wildness, oppression and darkness is a projection of the West 
in which its imperial needs were expressed — was associated with hopes 
for the return of the countries between the Elbe and the Dnieper to the 
true European family (they had never belonged to this family before, 
but this did not matter to Wolff). The Soviet Empire fell; the dawn of 
civilization was coming to Central Europe again. Although Wolff does 
not question the literal truth of the quoted Westerners, he suggests that 
their perception of Central and Eastern Europe was flawed: the structure 
of their narrative (and, therefore, its conclusion) was imposed on what 
they saw. The sad perception of Central and Eastern Europe was an 
ideological construct; the place deserved a better reputation. In the 1990s 
it seemed far-fetched, but possible.
Let’s now return to Müller’s idea of the “Global East”. It is very 
difficult to change the “mental map” (in Wolff’s words) of both the local 
people and Western elites. Also, it may not be worth trying, especially 
when the “Global East” nowadays seems to be the place of rising autho-
ritarianism and intolerance, a social space wholly different from liberal 
Western societies. In 2018, the American economist and influential 
political commentator Paul Krugman summarized the disappointment 
of the Western elites with Central and Eastern Europe in an anecdote 
which is worth quoting. 
When the Berlin Wall fell, a political scientist I know joked, ‘Now that Eastern 
Europe is free from the alien ideology of Communism, it can return to its true 
path: fascism.’ We both knew he had a point (Krugman 2018).
Changing this perception is going to be difficult and I am not sure 
it is really worthwhile at present. The “Global East”, meaning Central 
and Eastern Europe, is still grey, still poor, and still authoritarian (the 
roads have improved though, thanks to the European Union). Does this 
make the “Global East” a special place, worthy of its own distinction 
between North and South? I am not sure. It may only make the diffe-
rence between us and the West even more pronounced.
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